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EDDY WYMEERSCH*
Brexit is likely to lead to the relocation of UK financial services firms to the EU in order to be
able to access EUmarkets, mainly through the EU passport. The same applies to the EU firms
intending to be active on the UK markets. The access conditions to the EU markets are
numerous and complex, laid down in EU and national legislation and regulation, and applied
by the national supervisory authorities. The European Supervisory Authorities or “ESAs”
have published elaborate statements, called Opinions, on the detailed access conditions and
the way they intend to apply these. The two main objectives are the full application of EU
law, and the avoidance of authorizing EU firms that would be “empty boxes” for activity
that would in fact be exercised in the UK, and this mainly by delegating activities to another
firm. Underlying is a policy of competition between national economies for relocations of EU
firms, or of business activities to be developed on the UK financial markets.
Table of Contents ECFR 2018, 732–771
A. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 733
B. UK firms established in the EU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 733
1. Subsidiaries or Branches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 733
2. Access to EUmarkets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 735
3. Outsourcing and delegation in the applicable directives of regulation . . . 738
4. Positions of the regulatory and supervisory authorities as to the reloca-
tion of the UK firms to the European Union . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 747
C. EU firms established in the UK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 763
1. Banking supervision: The Prudential Regulatory Authority PRA . . . . . 763
2. Investment firms and market supervision: The Financial Consumer
Authority . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 764
3. Statements about future supervisory practice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 766
D. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 769
* University of Gent, European Banking Institute.
Brought to you by | Ghent University Library
Authenticated
Download Date | 11/5/19 7:02 PM
A. Introduction
The consequences of Brexit on the financial industry, both in the UK and in
the EU, call for close attention not only from the financial institutions in-
volved, but also from the financial authorities, and this both in the EU and in
the UK. As the date for decisions by the financial institutions are approaching,
the authorities have started to make public the way they intend to deal with the
numerous requests for adaptations. Their positions are necessarily subject to
the progress of the negotiations which have now been started and distinguish
whether access to their respective markets will be granted or not. Different
hypotheses are being analysed, going from full access – e.g. in case the UK
joins the EEA – to access for a transitory period, or only for specific topics on
the basis of Commission equivalence decisions, or finally in case no agreement
is reached, leaving the UK without guaranteed access, and according to the
residual position under the WTO, which however does not provide for
financial services.
The following analysis will essentially be based on the applicable legal frame-
work, and on the statements which have already been published by the
respective supervisory authorities. During the run-up to the final date, the UK
and the EU have adopted or announced statements about their action with
respect to the changes in access to each other financial markets. From the UK
side, this mainly concerns the so-called Withdrawal bill, still actively discussed
in the UK Parliament, while several policy statements have been developed
both by the UK authorities, and by the European institutions, especially also
by the European Supervisory Authorities. This complex landscape will be
analysed first as to the legal foundation on which these steps will be under-
taking, secondly identifying in some detail their main characteristics, and
finally to identify the differences in policy behind these initiatives.
B. UK firms established in the EU
1. Subsidiaries or Branches
From the European side the location of banks originating from the UK has
been the subject of elaborate discussions and legal analysis. Many UK-dom-
iciled banks, especially the ones with an investment bank profile, have been
present for several years in the EU often by way of one or more fully owned
subsidiaries. These entities are full EU credit institutions and could further be
active as the EU arm of the UK or international banking group, allowing them
to establish branches in other EU states or providing services in the EU
(passporting). Often their range of products or services is focused on invest-
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ment banking, offered by way of provision of services. In the context of Brexit,
many of the largest entities – especially the American groups – are already
planning to activate their pre-existing subsidiaries or establish new ones pro-
viding a wider range of services. They will not have to apply for new authorisa-
tions, but due to changes in their business model or in the volume of activity,
they will have to be screened by the EU competent authority1. This process for
the authorisation or for its review is under way, involving the national super-
visors and, where applicable, the ECB with respect to both large and small
entities, applying the national and the EU wide requirements. There is no
differentiation as to whether these applications originate from parent compa-
nies from the UK, or from any other non-EU jurisdiction, nor whether they
were submitted before or after Brexit. Generally, the EU regulation will apply,
standing for a largely uniform EU wide regime. National legislations may
however impose additional conditions, or make access more difficult in prac-
tice. For non-EU applicants, banking regulation does not grant a right to
access and the national regulations might be selective as to the origin of the
firms they admit2. It should be remembered that applications for new author-
isations in the euro area are processed at the national level, and – for banking –
ultimately approved by the ECB. For applications for establishment from the
non-euro area jurisdictions, the national authorities will grant the authorisa-
tion according to the applicable EU regulations: for banking or investment
firms, access will be granted essentially according to the national legislations
adopted pursuant to CRD IVand MiFID II, to be supplemented by important
regulations, such as the CRR or the MiFID regulation, or the SSM regulation
for Significant Banks. An interesting general consideration is that when the
UKwill be qualified as a third country, “in practice the degree of economic and
financial integration after Brexit will be significantly greater than with any
other third country”3. This attitude explains the more cooperative attitude
adopted in e.g. the EBA opinion.
Non-EU Credit institutions can also establish branches in the EU member
states. Their regime will be governed by national legislation of the state of
establishment, and their activity limited to that state. Offering services may be
allowed, in some cases restricted by local regulations, e.g. for consumer or
1 See ECB, Relocating to the euro area. Procedure for the relocation of banks to the euro
area in the context of Brexit (April 13, 2017), available at https://www.bankingsupervi
sion.europa.eu/banking/relocating/html/index.en.html.
2 For EU firms, refusals have to be based on objective reasons based on the public interest,
and restrictions have to be proportionate. These rules do not apply to third country firms
applying for access.
3 EBA Op/2017/12, Opinion of the European Banking Authority on issues related to the
departure of the United Kingdom from the European Union (October 12, 2017), p. 3.
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mortgage credit. Supervision will be national, or exercised by the ECB if part
of a significant group.
With respect to investment firms, a similar regime applies. In some cases,
financial groups – even banking groups – may stablish investment firms in the
EU as separate legal entities. These subsidiaries enjoy the full EU regime as an
investment firm and can offer their services all over the EU. In many cases this
option is economically not feasible since too expensive. Therefore, investment
firms often used the branch format, limited to the member state of their
location. Under MiFID II, the option is still open but is limited: the firm has to
be authorised and should meet the conditions mentioned in the regulation as
verified by that member state’s NCA4. There is no equivalence regime as such:
the latter will be opened up under MiFID II once the Commission will have
established an equivalence regime relating to the non-EU markets5. Passport-
ing will be one of the important advantages. In exceptional conditions, such as
in the case of “reverse solicitation”, services may be delivered without estab-
lishment.
2. Access to EUmarkets
Within the general regulatory regime, access to EU markets in the context of
Brexit will imply the application of the general provisions and conditions laid
down in the EU regulatory regime, which contains some additional conditions
for the first access from third country jurisdictions and will become applicable
to UK firms applying for the continuation of their activity in the EU. If these
firms are organised as subsidiaries and hence qualify as EU legal entities, there
will be no need to apply for a new authorisation. However, additional or
strengthened conditions will become applicable, as a consequence of the
change to more local activity of the subsidiary; the increase of the volume of its
operations, the mandatory adaptation of the organisational structure, condi-
tions relating to the parent company, e.g. as a fit and proper shareholder etc. If
new UK related entities will be set up, the entire authorisation procedure will
apply. In many cases these new entities will be former branches being con-
verted into subsidiaries in order to be able to enjoy the European passport, and
further offer their services in several Union states. Their previous legal status
will not play a significant role in the new authorisation procedure.
4 See Article 39 MiFID II; the conditions in Article 41 MiFID II; for “reverse solicitation”
(or: “the provision of services at the exclusive initiative of the client”): Article 42
MiFID II.
5 See Article 46 et seq.MiFIR, allowing for activities “throughout the Union”.
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Whether previously existing branches will continue to be active without
changes in their structure, or whether new branches will be created depends on
the type of activity. These branches would be subject to the local rules and
authorisations of the jurisdiction where they are located6. Therefore, being
limited to the local market, location decisions will depend on the potential
market: branches may expect sufficient business if located in the largest EU
states.
The ESAs have published extensive memos (here referred to as “Opinions”)
dealing with the points which will be of special importance in the authorisation
of these UK related entities. These will be analysed later7.
A second set of conditions for access to the EU markets will be the effective-
ness of their location. Although this requirement is not new, it has been of
central importance in the Brexit “relocation” debate.
Brexit has raised a debate about what is the real activity of a financial services
firm, and hence where its real or economic location is situated. This debate was
stirred by the concern that a number of UK financial services firms might
establish operations in the EU which cover only part of the full activity of
similar firms in that sector. The question concerns financial services firms not
only from the UK, but from all third country jurisdictions, and existed before
the UK leaving the EU. This practice refers to an organisation in which the EU
part of the activity mainly relates to the internal administrative and client facing
activity, including the registration of clients’ transactions and related opera-
tions. The real financial activity, or the transactional aspect, such as the lending
business or the asset management strategy and related activity like the portfolio
selection and risk strategy, is then located in another country, often at the
parent company’s headquarters. From there, the assets could be managed and
transactions processed, often as part of the wider activities of the group. The
substance of the EU part of these firms in terms or regulation and supervision
could be very thin, sometimes almost inexistent. As long as the other country
was part of the Union, freedom of services, identical regulatory basis and
cooperation between supervisory authorities were mostly considered suffi-
cient to deal with the potential risks of this firm structure. These principles are
not applicable to relations with third countries: hence the fundamental scheme
lost its regulatory justification.
In the Brexit context, this scheme comes under pressure: the former UK firms
will become third country firms, triggering a certain number of additional
requirements dealing with equivalence and supervisory cooperation. This
6 See for Investment firms, the conditions imposed by Article 39 et seq.MiFID II.
7 See further sub 4.
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question became especially preoccupying as it might have resulted in the UK
firm being considered to be in the EU, while the UK – and the related business
activity – has left the Union. From a supervisory point of view, and unless
specific conditions of cooperation can be worked out, this pattern cannot
further be considered acceptable.
This explains why the three European supervisory authorities and the ECB
have stated their formal position on the subject and indicated some of the
criteria to be respected as a “genuine” EU establishment of a third country
firm8. These opinions have developed their point of view under the heading of
“delegation” or “outsourcing”, being aware that these are the most frequently
used ways of transferring the financial effects of transactions to another
country, although by no means the only ones.
These Opinions contain a number of criteria or indications which supervisors
should verify to assess whether the third country firm stays within the limits of
a firm’s essential activity within the EU. A cross reading of these Opinions
points to several common aspects to which third country firms will have to pay
attention to secure their initial or continuous access to the EU markets. The
issues concern the entire range of financial services firms, active in all regulated
financial activities: credit institutions, investment firms and markets, invest-
ment managers and investment funds, but also insurance enterprises, payments
institutions etc.
8 EBA Op/2017/12, Opinion of the European Banking Authority on issues related to the
departure of the United Kingdom from the European Union (October 12, 2017); ESMA
Opinion 42–110-433, General principles to support supervisory convergence in the
context of the United Kingdom withdrawing from the European Union (May 31, 2017);
ESMA Press Release 71–99-469, ESMA Issues principles on supervisory approach to
relocations from the UK (May 31, 2017); ESMA Opinion 70–154-270, Opinion to
support supervisory convergence in the area of secondary markets in the context of the
United Kingdom withdrawing from the European Union (July 13, 2017); ESMA Opi-
nion 34–45-344, Opinion to support supervisory convergence in the area of investment
management in the context of the United Kingdom withdrawing from the European
Union (July 13, 2017); ESMA Opinion 35–43-762, Opinion to support supervisory
convergence in the area of investment firms in the context of the United Kingdom
withdrawing from the European Union (July 13, 2017).
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3. Outsourcing and delegation in the applicable directives of regulation
a) Outsourcing v. Delegation
In many other sectors of our economy, the practise has developed to contract
out certain activities to third party service providers, often to entities part of
the group, especially if the services can be provided at lower salaries. The
financial sector is no exception in this respect. The administrative processing of
transactions, including their accounting treatment by firms located e.g. in India
has been successfully practised for many years. Outsourcing of other activities
such as the location of transactions in another entity – a billing centre, where
the invoices are produced – has been usual in many sectors of the industry.
Outsourcing of IT services or call centres have been commonplace for big and
small enterprises. Proof reading of legal manuscripts for UK editors is often
executed in Asia, by experienced non-native proof readers.
Economies of scale, differences in remuneration, but also differences in applic-
able regulations and supervisory requirements may lie at the basis of this
practice. In the EU regulations, these practices are usually referred to as “out-
sourcing” or as “delegation” of functions.
The different treatment of outsourcing from delegation reveals the nature of
each of these: outsourcing mainly relates to technical acts, not involving much
of decision making and hence presenting less risks for the financial institution.
But risks may nevertheless emerge, e.g. a call centre giving wrong information.
Delegation means essentially the transfer of decisional, judgmental matters and
may therefore be source of considerable risk, justifying stricter regulation. The
differences between outsourcing and delegation may become increasingly
difficult to make: is a robot advisor, based on AI, to be classified under
delegation, implying some judgmental call, even when all decisions are made
without any human intervention? Some basic principles apply to both forms
of organisation: the delegating party remains responsible for the outcomes and
should oversee the way the activity is performed9. The regulation for delega-
tion is generally stricter, providing for equivalent supervisory conditions, for
supervisory cooperation, and defining the limits of activities which cannot be
delegated.
9 Article 21 (3) AIFMD and Article 75 Delegated Regulation 231/ 2013; Art 30 CSDR on
outsourcing; Article 31 and Article 47 MiFID II and the Delegated Regulation 2016/
2398; Article 31, Delegated regulation 2017/565.
738 EddyWymeersch ECFR 4/2018
Brought to you by | Ghent University Library
Authenticated
Download Date | 11/5/19 7:02 PM
b) Overview of delegation or outsourcing provisions in some directives and
regulations
(i) Outsourcing
Outsourcing is mentioned in certain directives or regulations. From the super-
visory angle, the core concerns are that the outsourcing entity should remain
in full control and bear full responsibility while its supervisors should be able
to fully access the outsourced activity and relating data, in some cases even
running on-site inspections, or imposing fines. Outsourcing may create opera-
tional risks but should not create additional financial risks: it should not lead
to delegation of responsibility. The rules relating to outsourcing are not
different whether EU or non-EU firms are being addressed.
Article 190 of the CRR, dealing with “credit risk control”, after having defined
the core responsibilities of the risk control units, lists the activities that may
validly be outsourced. These relate mainly to information collection and
reporting, allowing to monitor and grade risk pools and rating criteria. Fees
paid for outsourcing services to non-group entities will be accounted for under
“operating expenses” for establishing the relevant calculator10. Article 65(3)
CRD IV mentions that authorities could obtain information from outsources,
to whom “operational functions or activities” have been outsourced.
MiFID II provides that outsourcing of important operational functions to
third parties is subject to additional safeguards to avoid additional operational
risk. Important or critical operational functions may not be outsourced if this
would materially impair the quality of internal controls or the supervisor’s
ability to effectively supervise compliance with the firm’s obligations.11
MiFID II especially refers to outsourcing to third parties – intra or extra EU –
but only refers to information obligations of the EU firm. It should not affect
the firm’s internal controls nor the supervisory activity of the authorities12.
CSDR contains several references to “outsourcing” of activities by CSDs,
including to third country CSDs, what may not lead to delegation of responsi-
bility and should not prevent the exercise of supervisory functions13.
Solvency II follows a broader definition for outsourcing as it may relate to “an
arrangement of any form between an insurance or reinsurance undertaking
and a service provider, (...), by which that service provider performs a process,
10 Article 315 CRR.
11 Article 16(5) MiFID II, as part of the organisational requirements for investment firms.
12 Article 40 MiFID II.
13 Article 30 CSDR; see also Article 19 CSDR.
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a service or an activity, whether directly or by sub-outsourcing, which would
otherwise be performed by the insurance (...) undertaking itself”14. As in other
provisions, supervisors should have effective access to data relating to the
outsourced activity15. The outsourcing entity remains fully responsible16.
(ii) Delegation
The technique of delegation is known in several parts of the existing financial
regulatory system17. It has attracted attention in the field of asset management
including in the investment fund sector.
In the investment funds area, “delegation” as this is known in the applicable
regulations has often been a subject of regulatory attention. While recognising
the validity of the delegation, the 2009 UCITS Directive makes it clear that the
management company may not delegate the totality of its functions to third
parties and become a “letter-box” entity. The effectiveness of supervision
should in any case remain guaranteed. Moreover, the delegating company will
remain liable for the functions it has delegated18. The most critical form of
delegation is that of investment management itself: here the directive allows
Member States to provide for delegation to third entities if these entities are
authorised or registered for asset management and subject to prudential super-
vision19. Moreover, the delegation must follow the investment allocation criter-
ia adopted by the management company. It is allowed to delegate asset man-
agement to entities in third countries provided appropriate cooperation has
been agreed upon between supervisors. Delegation may be considered an
alternative formula to investment in a fund in another jurisdiction. In the
investment fund field, some incidents have urged the EU regulator to intro-
duce stricter rules for delegation of the custody or safekeeping function:
delegation and sub-delegation are authorised – even to third country dele-
gates – under some strict conditions20. The core provision here is that delega-
14 Article 11 (28) CSDR (defining outsourcing).
15 Article 38 Solvency II, dealing i.a. with the allocation of supervisory powers, even in the
absence of an insurance supervisor.
16 Article 49 Solvency II, providing for additional safeguards in case of outsourcing of
“critical or important functions”.
17 Even for supervisory activities, the legislation knows some cases of delegation: E. Wy-
meersch, Delegation as an instrument for financial supervision, available at https://ssrn.
com/abstract=952952.
18 Article 16 Directive 2009/65/EC referring to “letter box entities”.
19 Article 13 Directive 2009/65/EC; some activities, esp. client facing activities may not be
delegated: see Article 22 (a) Directive 2009/65/EC.
20 Certain functions cannot be delegated: see Article 22 (3) and (4). Among the conditions:
Suitability of the third party, its due skill care and diligence, and assets should be duly
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tion will not change the liability of the original depository, which is held to
strict liability: he remains held to restitute the securities or funds in any case, if
these are lost by the depositary or by the delegate and whoever was responsible
for the loss21.
The most elaborate regime of delegation is found in the AIFMD and the
relating Commission delegated regulation22. The general principles for the
delegation of AIFM functions23 require delegation to be based on objective
reasons, and not as a technique to circumvent responsibility or liabilities. The
financial supervisor will verify this point. In general delegation or sub-delega-
tion does not put an end to the final responsibility to the AIFM, who always
have to act in the best interest of the investors. The AIFM should at all times
dispose of the necessary tools to ensure it is able to exercise full control of the
delegated activities. His liability must be covered by adequate insurance24.
Certain activities cannot be delegated, such as prime brokerage, or are subject
to additional safeguards, such as portfolio and risk management25. Letter-box
companies are mentioned in the directive, but more specific criteria are laid
down in the regulation, dealing i.a. with requirements on expertise, resources,
investment management beyond certain limits26. The Commission is in charge
of monitoring the application of this regime on letter box entities and if the
conditions are not fulfilled, this may lead to withdrawal of the authorisation of
the AIFMwith respect to managing AIFs27.
Preceding the similar rules under the UCITS directive, the AIFMD imposes
specific safeguards relating to the depositary function. With respect to third
country depositaries the directive provides in the same safeguards as provided
segregated; see Recital (20) of Directive 2014/91/EU. High levels of investor protection,
rules on conduct and conflicts of interest should apply, especially by introducing a clear
separation of tasks and function between the custodian, the UCITS and the management
company, see Article 22 (a) (3) UCITS-Directive (as amended by Directive 2014/91/
EU). A special regime applies to delegation of the custody function relating to third
country securities if no local entities satisfy the delegation criteria, Article 25 (a) (3)
UCITS-Directive.
21 Article 22(a) and 24(a) UCITS-Directive (as amended by Directive 2014/91/EU); see
also: Delegated Regulation(EU) 2016/438.
22 Directive 2011/61/EU; Delegated Regulation (EU) 231/2013. For an analysis, see Ma-
son, Hayes & Curran, Delegation of Investment Management under the AIFMD,
available at https://www.mhc.ie/uploads/mhc_delegation_of_investment_managemen-
t_under_the_aifmd.pdf.
23 Article 20 AIFMD.
24 See Article 15 Delegated Regulation (EU) 231/2013.
25 Article 80 Delegated Regulation (EU) 231/2013.
26 Article 82 (1) Delegated Regulation (EU) 231/2013.
27 Article 82 Delegated Regulation (EU) 231/2013.
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for clients of EU depositaries28. Delegation of the depository function to a
third country institution is allowed under very strict conditions, largely iden-
tical to the ones applicable within the EU, such as prudential supervision29.
The liability of the primary depositary is formulated as strict liability, and will
apply, unless he can prove that the “loss was caused by an event beyond his
reasonable control”30.
(iii) Regime of delegation to third country institutions according to the direc-
tives
This short overview has brought to light that the concerns about delegation
and outsourcing have been alive for many years, but lead to an open approach
within the EU, with the home supervisor being adequately armed to check the
essential provisions to be respected.
Delegation, and to a lesser extent outsourcing may in extreme circumstances,
lead to a full transfer of internal functions of a financial institution so that the
remaining organisation would not allow that institution to function on its
own, as a sole entity. The remaining entity may have become a “letter-box
entity”, without any significant or relevant decision-making power of itself,
and would not exercise the essential functions of the type of firm it presented
itself to the outside world. The phenomenon exists in several parts of the
economic world, in different forms and intensities and has been considered
acceptable if these presented added value, or economies of scale. But when the
core business judgments are transferred, objections may be raised. Depending
of the specific facts, the independent existence of the delegating firm may be
denied, leading to attribute its activity to the delegator, and rendering the latter
responsible in case of insolvency31. In the field of portfolio management, the
effective portfolio management policy may be delegated to specialised man-
28 Article 21 (17) AIFMD: „the Commission shall adopt implementing acts, stating that
prudential regulation and supervision of a third country have the same effect as Union
law and are effectively enforced”.
29 Article 21 (11) AIFMD.
30 Article 21 (12) AIFMD („the consequences of which would have been unavoidable
despite all reasonable efforts to the contrary.”); compare the identical formulation in
Article 24 (1) UCITS-Directive.
31 Theremight also be a breach of the obligation to have registered office and business office
at the same place: Article 5 (4) MiFID II; Article 7 (1) (d) UCITSD; Article 8 (1) (e)
AIFMD (a rule which can be analysed as an early instrument against abusive delocaliza-
tion). These cases have been well documented both in the context of group law, andmore
exceptionally between independent companies; see European Company Law Experts
(ECLE), A Proposal for Reforming Group Law in the European Union – Comparative
Observations on theWayForward, available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=2849865.
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agers, not necessarily known to the portfolio investors, and creating additional
issues if several portfolios are managed on a common basis, generating risks in
terms of price sensitive information or even conflicts of interest. These prac-
tises have been known for many years but do not seem to have raised signifi-
cant supervisory concerns. The relevant directive contains detailed provisions
allowing to limit the scope of the delegation and requiring delegation to be
based on “objective reasons”32 Also, the practice was not negatively addressed
in the regulations on UCITS and on AIFM33.
Although delegation and outsourcing have been widely practised in the finan-
cial sector, there seems to be a stricter attitude being developed by the regula-
tors and supervisors to the extent that delegation and outsourcing may stand in
the way of the exercise of their supervisory powers, limit their oversight of the
remaining activities of the firms, and ultimately prevent to assess the risks that
may flow from these practices, ultimately affecting the supervised firm.
Delegation often takes place within the EU: it may then be considered to
benefit from the rules on freedom to provide services and should be considered
valid. But delegation should be limited, and not impinge on activities that leave
the existence of the delegating body intact. Delegation of all activities would
raise questions about the real existence of that body, and to whom its acts have
to be attributed. Whether delegation to third country entities should receive
the same treatment is open to discussion.
The limits of delegation and outsourcing have recently received additional
attention as a significant volume of delegation took place in favour of UK
firms, due to their central position in the European financial markets. Before
Brexit, delegation was part of the internal provision of services among EU
firms, subject to the same level of supervision. After Brexit, the question arises
under what conditions EU firms can receive financial services from non-EU
firms, which in the absence of an equivalence regime, are not subject to the
same safeguards. EU authorities would not have a statutory basis for request-
ing information, undertaking inspections, or even imposing fines to third
country subcontractors which are outside the reach of the EU law. Regulators
will be very loath to accept responsibility for activities which legally remain
beyond their reach. In case of mismanagement of misbehaviour, they may have
few excuses34. The contractual basis on which their actions would be under-
32 See Article 76 Delegated Regulation (EU) 231/2013.
33 Article 75 Delegated Regulation (EU) 231/2013 contains the general principles of dele-
gation, with a special section dealing with portfolio management, essentially providing
that the delegation is in line with the investment policy of the delegator.
34 See the regime of the depositary under the AIFMD and Articles 100–103 Delegated
Regulation (EU) 231/2013.
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taken, would not resist a likely challenge in the non-EU jurisdictions35. In the
absence of a regulatory basis for an equivalence assessment, after Brexit, it
would seem that this type of activity would not further qualify as a permissible
form of delegation.
In the field of portfolio management, the directive on UCITS and the MiFID
II delegated regulation provide in an explicitly organised regime allowing EU
investment firms to “outsource” to third country service providers “the invest-
ment service of portfolio management” under a certain number of conditions,
including a cooperation agreement with the supervisory authority of the
service provider36. There are no express conditions as to how far this form of
delegation of portfolio services can validly be agreed.
Objections to delegation – and to comparable techniques – are often men-
tioned in the context of “excessive” delegation, i.e. that this practice may lead
to “letter box entities”, or to “empty shell companies”which would negate the
separate existence of the delegator. Different techniques are mentioned. Con-
tractual delegation is the most frequently used: when essential functions have
been outsourced to another firm, what remains are essentially secondary,
formal or passive functions. Comparable outcomes result from back-to-back
invoicing, where transactions as agreed by a firm located in the EU are
immediately offset by an identical transaction with the party located in an-
other, possibly a third country37. The EU side might become a bookkeeping
facility, an “accounting entity”, without any financial consistency. A compar-
able outcome is achieved when an EU entity would act as an – independent or
not – agent for the foreign entity. Depending on the contractual arrangements,
the transaction would be attributed to the non-EU entity and hence would not
be booked in the accounts of the latter. Similarly, if the agent did not hold a
licence to operate in the EU, the activity might still be based on the “reverse
solicitation” exemption, which is based on the idea that investors may always
directly and voluntarily address themselves to third country intermediaries38.
In this case, active canvassing is not allowed and is likely to be strictly applied
by the supervisory bodies. But does it also cover further transactions flowing
35 Due to differences in standards of liability. In the Brexit case, execution of judicial
decisions of UK jurisdictions in the EUwould be problematic.
36 See Article 13 (1) (d) UCITS-Directive; Article 32 Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/
565.
37 See for an analysis EBA Op-2017-12, Opinion of the European Banking Authority on
issues related to the departure of the United Kingdom from the European Union
(12 October, 2017), p. 46 (no. 114); in fact, a comparable practice is followed for
derivatives’ clearing in the CCP, but a special regime applies there.
38 Article 42 MiFID II.
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from a pre-existing relationship39? The “reverse solicitation” regime is also
different from state to state, leading to specificities and additional limitations
or flexibilities40.
The arguments for refusing “letter box entities” to be active may be partly due
to supervisory, partly to competitive concerns, and are applicable to both
intra- and extra-EU delegation of fund management. Delegation to third
country service providers may however create substantial supervisory risks to
investors and creditors, as the latter may not be able to exercise effective
recourse on the entity and its few remaining assets, while these often lightly
capitalised firms will be liquidated before investors can act and disappear from
the radar screen. As the cost structure will be different, one may also fear a
competitive distortion with local firms, raising concern of unfair regulatory
competition. In supervisory terms, these firms will not allow the full super-
visory regime to be applied: their actions and policies will be dictated by
outside instructions, assets will be held abroad, risk controls may be difficult
39 See Shearman and Sterling, proposing a very wide allowance for “reverse solicitation”,
Continuity of contracts and business on a hard Brexit: Human rights and reverse
solicitation to the Rescue! (October 31, 2017), available at https://www.shearman.com/
perspectives/2017/10/continuity-contracts-business-on-hard-brexit. IRSG, The EU’s
third country regimes and alternatives to passporting (January 23, 2017), available at:
https://www.irsg.co.uk/assets/IRSG-Full-report-The-EUs-third-country-regimes-
and-alternatives-to-passporting.pdf, has doubts about the technique considering
whether this exception would allow active canvassing (see p. 15 and p. 118). See further
on this issue, raised also in the context of continuity of contracts: ISDA, Response of
ISDA to the European Commission Consultation Document on conflict of laws rules
for third party effects of transactions in securities and claims (June 29, 2017), available at
https://www.isda.org/a/AkiDE/isda-response-to-eu-condoc-on-conflict-of-laws.pdf;
ISDA FAQ 9.1 (April 10, 2018), available at https://www.isda.org/2018/04/10/brexit-
faq; pleading for a negotiated legal regime on continuity AFME, Impact of Brexit on
cross-border financial services contracts (September 8, 2017), available at https://www.
afme.eu/globalassets/downloads/publications/afme-brx-impact-of-brexit-on-cross-
border-financial-services-contracts.pdf. ESMA warned for misuse, not referring to the
private law aspects. The continuity of contracts along with market access to infrastruc-
ture are considered the main risks upon the UK’s withdrawal, see ESAs Joint Commit-
tee, Report on Risks and Vulnerabilities in the EU Financial System (April 12, 2018),
available at https://esas-joint-committee.europa.eu/Publications/Reports/Joint%
20Committee%20Risk%20Report.pdf. There are only a handful references in applic-
able regulations to jurisdictional matters.
40 See IRSG, The EU’s third country regimes and alternatives to passporting (January 23,
2017), p. 16; see pp. 108, 120 and 153 referring to the differences in national law:
Germany is more flexible, and Luxembourg has no regulation on the point. However, as
the definition of this practice will not further be a matter of domestic law, it is likely that
a quite restrictive reading will prevail.
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to apply, especially when e.g. in the field of asset management, portfolios are
managed on a common basis, leading i.a. to conflicts of interest.
Whether the existing provisions and practices relating to delegation, especially
in the field of portfolio management are satisfactory, or need to be revised in
the sense of more strictness, has been discussed in the context of the ESMA
Opinion. Those in favour of more strictness – especially from the French side –
where vigorously opposed by the defenders of the present system, represented
by the Luxembourg authority41. This discussion is part of the wide debate
about the centralisation of the supervisory powers at ESMA42.
The objections by the financial supervisors are not addressed to delegation or
outsourcing as such: these techniques are expressly addressed in the regula-
tions43, and can be used to support existing activity. This idea is translated by
requiring firm to state “objective reasons”44 for the delegation. At a later stage
the concern will result from the too intensive use of these techniques, leading
the EU entity to become an empty box. Therefore, a balance has to be struck
between permissible delegation and delegation that takes away the substance
of EU located entities. The ECB e.g. has stated that it will analyse each case
individually to decide whether the entity is a “real” bank, with adequate local
risk management, sufficient staff, and operational independence. Back-to-back
transactions are allowed but should be economically justified and not system-
atically lead to booking all exposures to another entity45. The condition that
41 See O. Walker, Washington joins fray over EU rules change, Financial Times (Febru-
ary 5, 2018); P. Jenkins, Brexit threat looms for asset managers amid fears on delegation
rules, Financial Times (September 5, 2017); P. Jenkins/J. Thompson, US fund body
warns of global risk from ‘delegation’ clash, Financial Times (November 19, 2017).
42 See A. Mooney/J. Thompson, Europe’s national regulators clash over delegation, Finan-
cial Times (October 8, 2017); see also A. Bailey, supporting the Luxembourg position,
and indicating that out of the 8 Tr GBP managed in the UK, 1 Tr are from overseas,
Investment Association Annual Dinner 2017 (October 17, 2017), available at https://
www.fca.org.uk/news/speeches/investment-association-annual-dinner-2017; see Arti-
cle 31a of the Commission proposal of 12 September 2018, COM(2018) 646 final.
43 Article 75 Delegated Regulation (EU) 231/2013 contains the general principles of dele-
gation, with a special section dealing with portfolio management, essentially that the
delegation is in line with the investment policy of the delegator.
44 See Article 76 Delegated Regulation (EU) 231/2013. The regulation also mentions the
prohibition to delegate to the depository, or to parties with a potential conflict of
interest.
45 See the Introductory Remarks by S. Lautenschläger, Member of the Executive Board of
the ECB and Vice-Chair of the Supervisory Board of the ECB, for the Technical work-
shop for banks considering relocation in the context of Brexit, held in Frankfurt am Main
on May 4, 2017, available at https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/press/
speeches/date/2017/html/ssm.sp170504.en.html.
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delegation should be based on objective reasons would also allow “necessary
or useful” delegation to be continued, as the Opinions only criticised excessive
delegation. Ultimately, the decision will be the result of an overall supervisory
assessment.
Some regulations contain interesting criteria for defining letter-box entities:
this is e.g. the case in the AIFMD field, indicating conditions in which the
AIFMwill no longer be considered managing an AIF46.
These considerations lie at the basis of the positions which the three ESAs
have adopted with respect to the issue of delegation and assimilated techni-
ques.
4. Positions of the regulatory and supervisory authorities as to the relocation of
the UK firms to the European Union
The three European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs) and the ECB have pub-
lished individual Opinions on the conditions according to which financial
institutions from the UK could further access the EU markets, after the UK’s
withdrawal. ESMA has published its Opinion on “General principles to
support supervisory convergence in the context of the United Kingdom with-
drawing from the European Union”47, which has been further detailed in three
other Opinions, one dealing with investment management48, one relating to
investment firms49, and a third one with secondary markets50. In addition, it
has released an Opinion on the principles on the “supervisory approach to
relocations from the UK”51.
46 Article 82, Delegated Regulation (EU) 231/2013.
47 ESMA Opinion 42–110-433, General principles to support supervisory convergence in
the context of the United Kingdom withdrawing from the European Union (May 31,
2017).
48 ESMA Opinion 34–45-344, Opinion to support supervisory convergence in the area of
investment management in the context of the United Kingdom withdrawing from the
European Union (July 13, 2017). The Opinion covers mainly UCITS and AIFs, apart
from the general matters under Article 1 (2) and (3) of the ESMARegulation.
49 ESMA Opinion 35–43-762, Opinion to support supervisory convergence in the area of
investment firms in the context of the United Kingdomwithdrawing from the European
Union (July 13, 2017). It covers all investment firms covered byMiFID II andMiFIR.
50 ESMAOpinion 70–154-270, Opinion to support supervisory convergence in the area of
secondary markets in the context of the United Kingdom withdrawing from the
European Union (July 13, 2017).
51 ESMA Press Release 71–99-469, ESMA Issues principles on supervisory approach to
relocations from the UK (May 31, 2017), covering the different multilateral trading
venues regulated under MiFID I and II andMiFIR (including MTFs, OTFs).
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The EBA has published its Opinion on the issues arising from the Brexit,
including a Report on insuring effective financial institutions avoiding “empty
shell companies” and therefore formulating conditions for a credible location
policy52. EIOPA has made its analysis from the point of view of supervisory
convergence53. The ECB has stated its position in an information document
dealing with the procedures for the relocation of banks to the euro area54, while
explaining in several speeches its supervisory expectations. The Council55 and
the Parliament56 have also stated their views.
The context in which these statements have been drawn up widely reflects the
specific situation of the UK firms, many of which were previously active as EU
firms, but after Brexit will relocate to the EU. In order to be able to pursue
their activity, they will have to adapt to their new status as “third country”
firms, requiring to set up a fully developed organisation within the EU.
In the following summary, an overview will be given of main directions of the
supervisory approach of the ESAs and the ECB and this with a view of identify-
ing their policy guidelines. As these Opinions are often very detailed, only the
elements that seem relevant for the present analysis have been mentioned. The
underlying policies are largely but – relating to different segments of the finan-
cial system – not fully identical. The main concerns of the supervisors will be
identified, aswell as someof the specific features due to theBrexit context.
ESMA has formally stated nine principles relating to the procedure to be
adopted with respect to the location of UK firms within the EU.57 Several of
these principles will be further analysed in the next pages. These principles
52 EBA Op/2017/12, Opinion of the European Banking Authority on issues related to the
departure of the United Kingdom from the European Union (October 12, 2017), cover-
ing credit institutions, investment firms, payment institutions, electronic money institu-
tions, credit intermediaries and non-credit institutions admitted under the Mortgage
Credit Directive.
53 EIOPA BoS-17/141, Opinion on supervisory convergence in light of the United King-
dom withdrawing from the European Union (July 11, 2017), covering insurance and
reinsurance.
54 ECB, Relocating to the euro area. Procedure for the relocation of banks to the euro area
in the context of Brexit (April 13, 2017), available at https://www.bankingsupervision.
europa.eu/banking/relocating/html/index.en.html
55 European Council, EUCO XT 20004/17, Guidelines following the United Kingdom’s
notification under Article 50 TEU (April 29, 2017),
56 European Parliament, 2017/2593(RSP), Resolution on negotiations with the United
Kingdom following its notification that it intends to withdraw from the European
Union (April 5, 2017).
57 ESMAOpinion 42–110-433; ESMA Press Release 71–99-469.
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have not been formally endorsed by the other ESAs, but would be largely
considered applicable as well:
1. No automatic recognition of existing authorisations;
2. Authorisations granted by EU27NCAs should be rigorous and efficient;
3. NCAs should be able to verify the objective reasons for relocation;
4. Special attention should be granted to avoid letter-box entities in the
EU27;
5. Outsourcing and delegation to third countries is only possible under strict
conditions;
6. NCAs should ensure that substance requirements are met;
7. NCAs should ensure sound governance of EU entities;
8. NCAs must be in a position to effectively supervise and enforce Union
law; and
9. Coordination to ensure effective monitoring by ESMA.
These principles lay at the basis of the Opinion as developed by ESMA and are
also largely reflected in the Opinion of the EBA and of the ECB.
a) Scope of the Opinions
These different statements not only address the pre- and post-Brexit phase –
and this under the proviso that no further transitional provisions will have
been agreed – but also indicate the general principles relating to the access of
any third country financial services firm to the EU. In that sense, they are
relevant first and foremost in the Brexit context, but will also apply to any
other request for access of third country groups. The statements also address
the pre-Brexit phase, as UK firms are already preparing their position under
the applicable EU regime: they address a range of cases, going from already
established firms whose business model, range of activity and risk structure
will considerably change after Brexit, to branches of UK firms which will
lose access to the EU at large and may consider adopting subsidiary status,
unless they prefer to limit their activity as a branch to the single member state
of location. In a number of cases, the Opinions relate to cases of new
establishments of UK firms who will prefer henceforth to have direct access
to the EU markets. These different hypotheses are not always clearly distin-
guished in the Opinions, which starts from the concept that in any case the
EU regime is fully applicable, will trigger the application of the entire
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regulatory apparatus – including RTS, ITS, and even ESA recommendations –
and will call for a detailed supervisory process from anew, but not calling
for a new authorisation process for those firms already established in the
EU58. Also, there is no need to develop a specific UK-related supervisory
regime as it will be the one applicable to any third country applicant.
These Opinions express the main points of the supervisory practice as it exists
today in the directives and regulations. Technically these Opinions cannot
derogate from the directives and regulations on which today’s supervisory
practice is based, but in practice they are in specific instances, stricter or more
detailed, an approach which most of the time can be justified by the actual
practice of today’s supervision. According to one leading source, the ESMA
Opinions reflect a “tougher appraisal of licence applications. EU regulators
may note the change of tone but continue to review relocation applications in
accordance with their current approach”59.
The question arises to what extent the supervisory practices detailed in the
Opinions are also applicable to existing firms already located in the EU and
whose legal structure – e.g. as a subsidiary – will not be changed. To the extent
that the Opinions reflect existing practice, this question might not be very
relevant but in most fields, the stricter appreciation provided in the Opinion
should logically also affect the existing firms, whether in the context of a
relocation or not. In the absence of specific regulation dealing with the case of
a Member State leaving the Union, the same rules should apply to the con-
tinuation of the same financial activity.
A related but different question arises when a credit institution transfers its seat
to another EU or third country jurisdiction while the legal entity is unchanged.
As the authorisations of credit institutions are based on national law, this
cross-border transfer of the seat may – depending on the applicable laws60 –
imply continuity of the legal person, but not of the authorisation, which is
rooted in the national laws of the two jurisdictions involved. There is up to
now no Europe-wide banking authorisation.
58 This explains the statement that NCAs and applicants should not rely on the decisions
of other competent authorities, cf. EBAOp/2017/12, pp. 5–6 (no. 15, 2nd point).
59 See Clifford Chance, Brexit: ESMA signals tougher stance on UK asset manager reloca-
tion to the EU (July 20, 2017), available at https://www.cliffordchance.com/briefings/
2017/07/brexit_esma_signalstougherstanceonukasse.html.
60 European Company Law has – yet – not adopted a EU wide approach to transfer of the
seat, except for a European Company (SE); see Article 8 SE-Regulation (EC) 2157/
2001.
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b) Addressees of the Opinions
These “Opinions” are statements addressed by the European Supervisory
Authorities (ESAs) to the national competent authorities, indicating the topics
which they will have to analyse in more detail in the requests for access to the
EU markets from UK firms. The Opinions are therefore addressed first to the
national competent authorities in the context of fostering a common super-
visory culture61 and more widely to the European institutions (Parliament,
Council and Commission) with a view of “contributing to the establishment of
high-quality common regulatory and supervisory standards and practices”62
especially in the perspective of enhancing supervisory convergence63.
As these Opinions have been adopted in the respective ESAs, one can presume
that they will be followed up in the respective supervisory practice of each of
their members. The 2017 proposed amendments to the ESA regulations clarify
that the Authority will monitor the Opinions, along with the guidelines and
recommendations, to verify that the arrangements on outsourcing, delegation
and risk transfer are in accordance with Union law64. In case a national
authority refuses to follow up the ESA recommendation, the reasons for the
refusal and the recommendation of the ESAwill be made public.
One could qualify these Opinions as the informed views as agreed by the
national authorities on the issues to be dealt with pre- and post-Brexit, coordi-
nated at the level of the ESAs. Although it is unclear to what extent these
Opinions have formally been coordinated with the Commission, they express
the common views of the regulatory community. Also striking is the absence
of references to the role of the ECB.
61 Article 29 (1) (a) ESMA, EBA and EIOPA Regulation. The EBA opinion also mentions
the Parliament, the Council and the Commission as addressees, as well as the ECB and
the SRB. It includes the NCAs of the EEA-EFTA states among its addressees.
62 See Article 8 (a) EBA Regulation. The EBA opinion is addressed to the NCAs and to
the Commission.
63 On the background, one can perceive concerns about competition among the MS for
new locations of financial services firms.
64 See Article 31a of the Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the
Council Amending Regulation (EU) No 093/2010 (September 20, 2017), COM (2017)
536 final: “Coordination on delegation and outsourcing of activities as well as of risk
transfers”.
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c) Full application of the EU regime
Dealing with the core aspects of the regulation in their respective fields, the
Opinions stress the full application of the authorisation procedures: all require-
ments have to bemet, even those that havenot yet been adopted by theCommis-
sion65. There will be no shortcuts and the previous Opinions of other NCAs or
other authorities66 will not be considered decisive, but where necessary the
existing licence will have to be reviewed and upgraded due to the change in
nature or increase in the business activity making additional or stricter condi-
tions becoming applicable. A thorough analysis of the present and future busi-
ness activities will lead to a reappraisal of the business, its structure, governance,
management, staffing67, internally special risk procedures, commercial policies,
etc. Resolution and deposit guarantee regimes and their possible limitations are
also to be considered. Some flexibility seems to have been considered, when the
Opinion states that “the status of applicable regulations and practices in the UK
may be taken into account”, sometimes even leading to waivers68. Elements
relating to the relocationwouldnot qualify.
d) Common concern: letter box companies
A quite predominant, recurrent consideration in the Opinions is the concern
that former or newUK firms would bemanaged as “empty shells”, or as “letter
box companies” or “brass plate firms”. This concern has also beenmentioned in
several directives69 and is here translated in a whole series of more detailed
warnings or statements, some of which will be quite incisive. The concern is
expressed in the overarching statement that the applicants will have to state
objective factors to justify their choice for a certain jurisdiction70, for a certain
organisational structure, for the proposed governance regime, in other words
65 EBAOp/2017/12, p. 23 (no. 17).
66 Even by mutual recognition: EBAOp/2017/12, p. 23 (no. 17).
67 See ECB, Brexit: an ECB supervision perspective (November 15, 2017), available at
https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/press/publications/newsletter/2017/html/
ssm.nl171115_2.en.html: “dual hatting” raises concern as to independence of the func-
tion, conflicts of interest and insufficient time commitment.
68 See e.g. EBA Op/2017/12, p. 25 (no. 23) on the coordination of laws, regulations and
administrative provisions relating to undertakings for collective investment in transfer-
able securities (UCITS); Article 20 AIFMD.
69 Recital 16 and Article 13 Directive 2009/65/EC; Recital 83 and Article 20 AIFMD.
70 ESMAOpinion 35–43-762, p. 3 (no. 12), p. 9 (no. 34); see also p. 12 (no. 45) for the cost
savings argument; idem for delegation to non-EU entities. The “objective choice” idea
was already part of some directives.
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that their proposal does not constitute a device for evading or circumventing the
existing access restrictions, to engage in regulatory arbitrage, ormore positively
will result in a genuine financial services firm which is part of the EU financial
system.The same ideahas been stated inECBstatements71.
This reference to “objective factors” of choice both for the jurisdictions and
for the structure of the firm in the EU can be considered a safeguard for the
applicant’s commitment to play a role in the EU markets, as a call for his
acceptance of the rules applicable in the host country. The principle is clearly
stated in the EBA, the ESMA Opinions and very strongly in the ECB state-
ments and is further developed in many specific recommendations, going from
the governance of the applicants, their risk management, their internal struc-
ture, including their outsourcing and delegation. The EBA Opinion makes a
nuanced statement as to how back-to-back and intragroup dealings have to be
dealt with as part of a separate legal entity. There should not be an outright
prohibition, but a stronger attention from risk management, including on
counterparty risk72, drawing attention to possible risk considerations. A com-
parable statement was published by the UK PRA73.
e) Subsidiaries or branches
The Opinions first address the requirements applicable to subsidiaries of UK
institutions, which for credit institutions is the full regulatory regime applic-
able to all credit institutions, coordinated by the ECB’s final authorisation
right.
Branches of UK credit institutions will be subject to the requirements as
established by the local legislation and supervision of the state where the
branch is located. They often differ from state to state: the CRD IV only
requires that States do no engage in regulatory competition by adopting a
regime that is more favourable than that of branches of EU institutions74. As to
the differences between EU states, a regime providing for an identical treat-
ment EUwide has been mentioned in the CRD IV but has not been implemen-
ted, leaving some room for competition among Member States. The activity of
71 See ECB, Brexit: an ECB supervision perspective (November 15, 2017), available at
https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/press/publications/newsletter/2017/html/
ssm.nl171115_2.en.html.
72 See the list of conditions in EBAOp/2017/12, p. 15.
73 PRA Consultation Paper CP 29/17, International banks: the Prudential Regulation
Authority’s approach to branch authorisation and supervision (December 2017), p. 27
Box 5 on booking arrangements.
74 Article 47 CRD IV.
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these branches is in any case limited to their state of location. De facto, this
may lead to a preference for the constitution of subsidiaries rather than
branches, as the former enjoy the EU passport, but would imply the applica-
tion of the full EU regulation. The financial authorities also prefer subsidiaries,
as the financial position of these firms and the applicable regulations would be
more clearly defined, stricter management provisions apply and more own
funds would be available. Also, the relations with the supervisory authorities
in the state of origin should be based on a more clearly defined equal basis.
Depending on their specific business activity or model, it is likely that some
subsidiaries of UK banks will reach the criteria for qualifying as an SSM bank
and hence be subject to direct ECB supervision75. Up to now, no comparable
regime applies to subsidiaries of investment firms in the absence of an EUwide
supervisory regime: hence these will remain subject to the regulation and super-
vision of the firm’s home state76. Recently EBA and ECB have published state-
ments to declare the SSM framework in part applicable to significant investment
firms,while theCommissionplans to propose regulationon this topic77.
According to the applicable regulation78, third country investment firms – both
subsidiaries and branches – are subject to the host state’s regulation and super-
vision and the activity of their branches is limited to that state. It is often
considered too expensive and burdensome to create a subsidiary for invest-
ment firm activity, although in that case it would benefit from the European
passport79.
75 The criteria of Article 6 SSM-Regulation address the credit institution on a consolidated
basis, including the UK entities pre-Brexit. Post-Brexit significant institutions may
become less significant as only EU entities will be included in the EU supervision.
76 See Article 6 (3) MiFID II; see also Article 3 (c): national exemption of order transmis-
sion activity to third countries.
77 See EBA Op/2017/12, p. 5 (iv); EBA Op/2017/11, Opinion of the European Banking
Authority in response to the European Commission’s Call for Advice on Investment
Firms (September 29, 2017); European Commission, Review of the prudential frame-
work for investment firms (December 20, 2017), available at https://ec.europa.eu/info/
publications/171220-investment-firms-review_en, with proposals for a regulation and a
directive (COM(2017) 791 final); Proposal for a Regulation on the prudential require-
ments of investment firms and amending Regulations (EU) No 575/2013, (EU) No 600/
2014 and (EU) No 1093/2010 (December 20, 2017), COM(2017) 790 final; ECB,
Opinion on the review of prudential treatment of investment firms (CON/2018/36)
(August 22, 2018), available at https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/ecb/legal/
pdf/en_con_2018_36_f_sign.pdf.
78 For Credit institutions on the basis of CRD IV; for investment firms the regime has
changed starting 2018 on the basis of MiFID II.
79 Downsides of the subsidiary format include requirements in terms of legal capital,
dedicated staff, systems and controls, local supervision, and expensive and time-con-
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f) Main requirements to be applied to UK firms locating in the EU
The Opinions present the subject by describing the conditions and procedures
for authorising a bank, an investment firm, or depending on the case, invest-
ment managers, secondary markets, or insurance firms. The following main
topics are summarised here in some detail:
– Authorisation
– Governance
– Internal controls
– Delegation and outsourcing.
(i) Authorisation
The Opinions distinguish firms which have already been authorised, but
whose status changes from EU firms to non-EU firms, and those which apply
for a new authorisation, for which the existing EU rules will apply80. In both
the EBA81 and the ESMA Opinion, it is made clear that subsidiaries will not
have to be re-authorised, but that the firms will not be allowed to merely rely
on the existing authorisation. Their position will have to be reviewed on the
basis of the new actual or proposed business model and plans, which may lead
to a considerable business expansion, needing additional means in terms of
organisation, especially risk management. The proposed business entity
should correspond to the envisaged activity in terms of size, nature, and
complexity. A reassessment of the existing organisation, governance, business
model and business plan will be undertaken. New issues will receive special
attention, such as the effect of a non-EU management, the qualification of
significant shareholders, or the relations with a non-EU group. Group rela-
tions with non-EU parties deserve special attention82.
The freedom of establishment or of services is extended to “financial institu-
tions” other than credit institutions which are part of a group led by a credit
institution governed by EU law. The financial institution should be 90%-
owned by the credit institution, and fully guaranteed by the latter. Once as a
suming authorization process, cf. IRSG, The EU’s third country regimes and alterna-
tives to passporting (January 23, 2017), p. 121 (at 7.12).
80 See ESMAOpinion 42–110-433.
81 EBA Op/2017/12, p. 24 (no. 17); ESMA Opinion 34–45-344, p. 3 (no. 11) mentioning
that there are no transitional provisions.
82 ESMAOpinion 34–45-344, p. 3 (no. 13).
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consequence of Brexit the parent is no longer an EU entity, this special regime
would come to an end, the subsidiary will lose its privilege to be able to offer
banking services as defined83.
The Opinions also state that applicants for an authorisation will not be able to
rely on previous or existing authorisations, whether from another Member
State or from a third country84. This especially refers to applications from firms
formerly authorised in the UK or active in the EU as branches. But their file in
the UK could usefully be submitted to the authority in the new State of
location, mainly for informative purposes.
NCAs are invited to monitor developments of UK law, and be alert for differ-
ences that may affect equivalence or change the risk profile. In the absence of
cooperation agreements providing for a mutual information duty, this task will
best be exercisedby theESAs, andbe applicable to all relevant third countries.
With respect to new authorisations the reasons for the choice of the jurisdic-
tion have to be stated and will be assessed by the national authority. This may
be one of the decisive elements for refusing access, on the basis that the choice
is determined by opportunistic motives, possibly by regulatory competition,
or by an attempt to evade stricter standards85.
But whether the national authority would be entitled to state other grounds on
which the access will be refused, including on the basis of that state’s policies,
or for political reasons, will depend on its national legislation. Overbanking
e.g. could become a valid ground for refusing access, but the present EU
legislation does not provide an adequate legal basis for deciding so86. The level
playing field would be seriously jeopardised in case political reasons would
determine the authorisation of financial institutions within the EU, but this
does not apply in relation to third countries.
(ii) Governance
The governance of both existing and new entities receives considerable atten-
tion. The central idea is that the firm will be required to dispose of an effective
and sound governance structure in the EU87, capable of performing their
83 See the regime of Article 34 CRD IV.
84 EBAOp/2017/12, p. 24 (no. 17).
85 EBAOp/2017/12, p. 25. Where applicable, the ECBwill apply the same reasoning.
86 H. Jones, A. MacAskill, and A. Davies, EU watchdog urges ‘overbanking’ solution to
start local, Reuters (September 27, 2017), available at https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-
summit-regulation-enria-banks/eu-watchdog-urges-overbanking-solution-to-start-lo-
cal-idUKKCN1C21FC.
87 EBAOp/2017/12, p. 44 (no. 105).
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functions, both in terms of management functions and in terms of internal risks
controls. The EU firm should be an independent entity managed in its own
interest. The management – or directors – will, as ultimate decision makers,
have collective responsibility and should effectively be in charge of decision
making and not merely rely on the instructions of the parent company. They
should have a “meaningful presence” in the chosen jurisdiction and be avail-
able for interaction with the supervisors88. Some statements point to a resi-
dence requirement89. Therefore, the number of top management should be
adequate in terms of numbers – at least two for asset management,90 and
composition, and dedicate sufficient time to their professional duties. The
number of outside positions of directors should therefore be limited, to avoid
too strong group influence but also to avoid conflicts of interest91.
In the investment management sector, the directors will have to be attributed
specific responsibilities, which they should exercise personally, without dele-
gation, but remaining collectively responsible. There will be no reporting lines
to group functions92. Directors will have to be available for the firm, and
dedicate sufficient time to it, what would be incompatible with a large number
of outside directorships. Also, a local presence is expected, implying availabil-
ity for the supervisors during normal business hours. A local domicile is not
strictly mandated, although in some jurisdictions this may flow from the rules
on establishment93. The firms should also have a sufficient operational set-up
and dispose of appropriate human resources and technical resources94.
(iii) Internal governance and controls
The adequacy of the structures and governance put in place will be assessed
from the relocation perspective, with – the principal element in the assessment –
88 For UCITS it is reminded that head office and registered office have to be in the same
location: Article 7 (1) (d) Directive 2009/65/EC; see ESMA Opinion 34–45-344, p. 4
(no. 16).
89 ESMA Opinion 42–110-433, p. 6 (no. 38): key executives and senior managers should
be “employed in the Member State of establishment and work there to a degree propor-
tionate to their envisaged role, if not on a full-time basis”. Cf. ESMA Opinion 34–45-
344, p. 7 (no. 28): presence during normal business hours.
90 ESMAOpinion 34–45-344, p. 4 (no. 16).
91 See about these aspects ESMAOpinion 35–43-762, pp. 4–6 (no. 14–22); ESMAOpinion
34–45-344, p. 5 (no. 23).
92 ESMA Opinion 35–43-762, p. 5 (no. 18–20); compare the Senior Managers Regime in
the UK (sub C.1.).
93 Residence requirements exceptionally apply to company directors ormanagers in general
in some jurisdictions suchas in Italian law for third country executives and inSwiss law.
94 ESMAOpinion 35–43-762, p. 4 (no. 13).
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special attention for the objective reasons for this decision. The structure of its
local risk management should be commensurate to size, nature and complexity
of the proposed business activity95.
Reporting lines to the group should not impair the independence of the
internal control and compliance functions, which should function on the basis
of the separate entity and be internally separated96, and reporting lines to group
control functions should not impair independence97.
The necessary internal controls have to be available, with as a minimum the
compliance and risk functions. Material legal risks have to be assessed by
an independent party and in general, risks have to be reported to the board and
to the supervisors. In the banking sector, an elaborate analysis of the riskmodels
is required: these will remain applicable, unless a change in the business or
volume of its activity has intervened. The EBA Opinion analyses the different
cases in which internal models can further be used or will be submitted to a new
analysis and authorisation procedure by the EU authority98. Delegation of
control functions within the same group calls for effective conflict of interest
management99. Theymayhave tobe calibrated followingdetailed criteria100.
(iv) Delegation and outsourcing
The developments in the Opinions on delegation and outsourcing are particu-
larly relevant as these techniques may lay at the basis of the much decried
“empty shell” of “letter box companies” and other forms of circumvention of
the EU rules. In general terms, delegation and outsourcing are permissible if
based on objective reasons, on a limited scale, and without putting oversight in
danger. In the asset management field, investor protection remains the para-
mount objective.
Delegation should be based on identifiable objective reasons101, chosen on the
basis of a thorough analysis, taking into account its materiality. The delegate
95 ESMA Opinion 34–45-344 contains a long list of criteria for applicant assessment by
the NCAs. Attention to AML/CTF considerations is mentioned.
96 ESMA Opinion 35–43-762, p. 5 (no. 19 et seq.); ESMA Opinion 34–45-344, pp. 7–8
(no. 31) prescribing guidelines for assessing material legal risks and how external legal
advisors should be designated.
97 ESMAOpinion 34–45-344, p. 5 (no. 20).
98 EBA Op/2017/12, p. 40 (no. 99); see EBA RTS/2016/03, Final Draft Regulatory
Technical Standards (July 21, 2016).
99 ESMAOpinion 34–45-344, p. 16 (no. 66).
100 See ESMAOpinion 34–45-344, p. 6 (no. 25).
101 See Article 76 Delegated Regulation (EU) 231/2013; ESMA Opinion 34–45-344, p. 10
(no. 43): if cost saving is argued, evidence for it should be provided; see also Article 82
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should be the most suitable for undertaking the delegated function102, located
in a jurisdiction chosen on objective grounds, and be able to comply with the
applicable EU regulations103. If cost savings are argued, these should be
proved. The same applies to outsourcing: objective reasons, with a limited
scope, especially if it relates to critical functions and if not satisfactory may
even have to be phased out104. For intra-group outsourcing, special attention is
due because of conflicts of interest105. Sufficient oversight mechanisms have to
be provided106.
Delegation to non-EU entities calls for special attention. The most delicate
aspect relates to the delegation to a non-EU service provider of the “functions
relating to the investment service of portfolio management” of investment
firms: this delegation is authorised but subject to some general conditions such
as the authorisation of the third country service provider in its jurisdiction,
effective supervision by its competent authority and the existence of a coopera-
tion agreement between competent authorities, providing for exchange of
information, and cooperation for enforcement purposes. Delegation of invest-
ment management for UCITS management companies has a regulatory ba-
sis107, but it should not exceed by a substantial margin the investment manage-
ment functions performed internally: there should at least be some investment
management present in the state where the fund is located and this for each
individual fund108. This fund should have at least some senior management or
staff to follow up on the performance of portfolio management or risk man-
agement. One should remind that a separate regime applies to outsourcing of
the depositary function, as the first line depositary remains strictly liable for
the restitution of funds and securities: here again the regulation reminds that
these cases of delegation should not result in the management company
becoming a letter box entity109. This approach should apply to both new, UK
(1) (d) Delegated Regulation (EU) 231/2013 listing criteria for permissible delegation,
including the case that the delegated activity would “exceed by a substantial margin the
management functions performed by the AIFM itself”.
102 ESMAOpinion 34–45-344, p. 12 (no. 50).
103 ESMAOpinion 34–45-344, p. 10 (no. 49).
104 ESMAOpinion 35–43-762, p. 9 (no. 34 and 36).
105 ESMAOpinion 35–43-762, p. 9 (no. 36).
106 See for the details, ESMAOpinion 35–43-762, pp. 11–12 (no. 44).
107 See for the conditions for delegation to third country service providers: Article 32
Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/565; compare Article 13 UCITS-Directive, according
to which delegation of the management company own functions is subject to the home
Member state law.
108 ESMAOpinion 34–45-344, p. 13 (no. 56).
109 Article 13 (2) Directive 2009/65/EC.
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originated funds as to existing ones, in the latter case under the form of super-
visory reassessment110.
These provisions address all EU funds, irrespective of the jurisdiction where
the delegated functions will be exercised. The basic idea, also voiced in the field
of banking supervision, is that local “substance” should remain111, implying i.a.
sufficient activity and staff112. A similar approach addresses the outsourcing of
functions by EU trading venues113. EU venues should not become letter-box
entities, and the coordination between the EU venue and the non-EU out-
sourced venue should remain ensured114. Some operational functions should
not be delegated to non-EU venues, such as the responsibility for suspensions,
removal of instruments, or trading halts115.
Internal control should be risk based and allow for on-site inspections116. In
the same vein, the ESMA opinion reminds the application of the “best execu-
tion” principle: the choice for an execution venue should be based on objective
elements. The choice for a single execution venue or to an affiliate party may
call for additional monitoring in view of the best execution requirement.
(v) Relocation policy
The Opinion published by the ESAs state the conditions which non-EU
firms – especially UK firms – will have to meet to be allowed to exercise
financial services activities in the EU. The Opinions draw attention to the role
of the EU National competent authorities which are expected to give high
priority to these location requests, exposing the main points of attention. The
basic rule is the full application of the EU laws and regulations to these entities
and for already established entities, to be adapted in light of their changed
activity. They do not mention the right of Member States to refuse access to
non-EU firms. This is translated by stating that applicable regimes will be
110 ESMAOpinion 34–45-344, p. 15 (no. 62).
111 See ECB, Brexit: an ECB supervision perspective (November 15, 2017), available at
https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/press/publications/newsletter/2017/
html/ssm.nl171115_2.en.html; ESMA Opinion 34–45-344, p. 13 (no. 56): no wider
delegation than the usual internal activities. Recital 16 CRD IV mainly draws attention
to regulatory arbitrage.
112 ESMA Opinion 34–45-344, p. 14 (no. 60): three local FTE for portfolio management
and/or risk management and monitoring of delegates; in case of relocation sufficient
activity is to be transferred to the EU delegate state (no. 61).
113 See ESMAOpinion 70–154-270.
114 E.g. ESMAOpinion 70–154-270, p. (no. 30) on suspension or removal from trading.
115 But the technical arrangements can be located outside the EU, see ESMAOpinion 70–
154-270, p. 5-6 (no. 30).
116 See ESMAOpinion 35–43-762, p. 10 (no. 40).
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applied on the basis of the “objective reasons” for relocation: the fundamental
option remains that third country firms may lawfully become – or remain –
active in the EU.
Nevertheless, the ESMA statement is revealing: “NCAs should reject any
relocation request creating letter-box entities where, for instance, extensive use
of outsourcing and delegation is foreseen with the intention of benefitting from
an EU passport, while essentially performing all substantial activities or func-
tions outside the EU27”117. One could qualify this as abuse of the access rights.
As freedom of establishment will not further apply, it will be up to the NCAs
to develop their own policies as to the location or relocation of UK firms. The
Opinions aim to contribute to supervisory coherence118, what in fact also
stands for avoiding regulatory competition and resulting arbitrage.
The Opinions express a strong concern that non-EU firms may take advantage
of the NCA’s openness. This concern is expressed in many ways, most fre-
quently in the repeated reference to “letter-box entities”, “empty shells”, or
“brass plate firms”. Generally, it is up to the NCA to draw the balance between
the objective reasons for locating to its jurisdiction compared to the not
credible ways as evidenced in its internal organisation Specific criteria are
mentioned: in the Opinion on asset management, ESMA refers to the reloca-
tion of a sufficient amount of the portfolios managed and relating risk manage-
ment functions, also referring to availability of a supporting organisation such
as financially experienced and supporting staff. NCAs should also be attentive
to the need for an efficient organisation of the financial activity and should only
come to a negative conclusion when the balance has become too much out of
kilter. How to test the genuineness of an applicant’s intention will remain
difficult: stating the reasons for the choice and indicating the ways the proposed
objective will be achieved, should allow to eliminate the most blatant cases.
On the basis of the regulatory provision that head office and registered office
should be in the same member state119, the ESMA opinion goes in very specific
detail about the internal organisation, required the main functions to be devel-
oped locally and even calling for the physical presence of at least two senior
managers and relevant staff -3 local FTEs.120 These detailed assessment criteria
117 ESMAOpinion 42–110-433, p. 5 (no. 28). See also no. 35: key function activities in the
EU.
118 To be mentioned here is the ESMA initiative to create a Supervisory Coordination
Network as a tool for monitoring national positions, ESMA Opinion 35–43-762, p. 2
(no. 7).
119 See supra fn. 88.
120 See ESMA Opinion 34–45-344, p, 9 (no. 36 et seq., esp. no. 60); see also the comments
on the so-called “white-label business”, p. 9 (no. 37); Similar concerns led to strong
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have however to be considered in the overall context of the effectiveness of the
local entity.
The interests involved in these cases go beyond the technical application of the
existing EU regulations. They ultimately concern wider policy objectives, such
as the orderly functioning of the markets, the maintaining of a high degree of
investor protection, the confidence in the financial systems, containing risk
developments especially at the systemic level or when imported from other
jurisdictions. But beyond these traditional objectives of financial regulation,
one should not deny that competition for market share, involving states and
supervisors, their markets and their operators are the significant drivers behind
these opinions121. Tightening access to EU markets without blocking it, may
contribute to achieve a balanced outcome in the interest of all parties con-
cerned.
(vi) Non-EU Branches of EU firms
The ESMA Opinions on Investment firms and Asset management deal with
the case in which EU located firms, e.g. a subsidiary of a UK firm, establish a
branch outside the EU, e.g. in the UK, from which UK based activity could be
developed. In principle, there should be no objection against this scheme,
which is a matter that mainly relates to the establishment in the UK. However,
branches of EU banks in non-EU jurisdictions should be authorised by the
home state (EU) supervisor. Moreover, the real concern relates to the risks that
this scheme might create specific letter-box risks. The opening of these non-
EU branches should be based on objective reasons, related to the services in
these non-EU jurisdictions, e.g. for organising marketing support122.
Firms may use technical legal instruments to locate activities outside the EU:
in these cases, activity is outsourced, or is delegated to a non-EU entity. This
may take the form of back-to-back transactions123 and should not be used to
service back the EU firm’s activities or its clients to the UK acting through its
branch. Specific oversight by the NCAs is called for.
statements from the ECB about the banks’ slow progress in establishing an effective
presence in the EU, especially in the field of risk management.
121 See among many: S. Khan, The EU is ready to reap the profits from our financial
services and there’s nothing we can do. The Independent (March 25, 2018), available at
https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/financial-services-city-london-european-un-
ion-lch-lse-euro-clearing-ecb-brexit-latest-a8272356.html.
122 See ESMA Opinion 35–43-762, p. 13 (no. 49); a similar recommendation in ESMA
Opinion 70–154-270, p. 6 (no. 35); and ESMA Opinion 34–45-344, p. 16 (no. 68);
effective supervision of the branch is required.
123 See EBAOp/2017/12, pp. 47 et seq. (no. 120 et seq.) including intragroup transactions.
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The IRSG, a group organised by CityUK, took a more liberal attitude124. But
at the end only courts can tell.
C. EU firms established in the UK
1. Banking supervision: The Prudential Regulatory Authority PRA
Before Brexit, EU firms established in the UK could operate under the free-
dom of establishment and hence carry out their activity as branches, which was
the preferred mode of operation, allowing for maximum flexibility, lower costs
and sometimes allowing for a rather modest presence both in terms of staff and
of funding. Financial supervision was exercised by the home authority and
cooperation agreements with the UK authorities were in place. This regime
will not be continued and firms will have to apply for an authorisation from
the Prudential Regulatory Authority (PRA), whether as a UK bank, in which
case requirements applicable to UK banks will apply, or as a branch of an
“overseas” bank. About 77 EEA banks will have to apply to the PRA for a
new licence, a process that would take about 12 months. This would take a
considerable time, and therefore some “grandfathering” has been proposed,
provisionally continuing the existing licence125, as otherwise the customers
may be lost and the markets disrupted.
Since 2016, the Senior Managers Regime aimed at increasing personal responsi-
bility of manager in the financial services industrywas introduced, applicable to
all banks, to certain PRAdesignated investment firms and to theUKbranches of
foreign banks. FromDecember 2019 it will be extended to all financial services
firms, irrespective of their size.This regime is composedof three elements: (i) the
Senior Managers Regime126, applicable to larger firms; every senior manager
should sign a ‘statement of responsibilities’ clearly identifying his responsibil-
ities and his accountability, and this notwithstanding his overall responsibility
for the firms functions and activities. The firm has to declare that the manager is
suitable to exercise the stated functions.At least once a year, firms need to certify
that senior managers are suitable to do their jobs: (ii) the Certification Regime,
which applies at all ‘material risk-takers’ in a firm, requiring them to be fit and
124 IRSG, The EU’s third country regimes and alternatives to passporting (January 23,
2017), p. 122 (at 7.15).
125 H. Jones, Bankers call on Bank of England to act fast on EU branches, Reuters
(December 11, 2017), available at https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-britain-eu-banks/
bankers-call-on-bank-of-england-to-act-fast-on-eu-branches-idUKKBN1E51EG.
126 FCA, Senior Managers and Certification Regime: banking (July 26, 2017), available at
https://www.fca.org.uk/firms/senior-managers-certification-regime/banking.
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proper to perform the function; (iii) the rules of Conduct, applicable to both
senior managers and material risk-takers. Less well known is that banks should
include a whistleblowing policy into their code of conduct127. Also, foreign
bankswith a small business activitymight be exempted.
One should also mention the “overseas persons” regime, allowing firms which
do not have a permanent place of business in the UK, but are located in the
EU, or in other jurisdictions (e.g. the US), to undertake certain financial service
activities in the UK. The exemption is narrowly defined and includes dealing
in investments, as principal or as agent, arranging investments deals or advising
thereon, but also operating a multilateral trading facility.
The Bank of England would receive additional powers to supervise non-UK
CCPs128 and CSDs.
After Brexit the need for cooperation with the EU supervisory bodies will
become increasingly urgent129
2. Investment firms and market supervision: The Financial Consumer
Authority
After Brexit, and absent any agreement to the contrary, EU investment firms
could be active in the UK market whether as a subsidiary or as a branch. It can
be expected that the UK will apply to these firms a third-country regime, as
defined in UK law, in this case the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000
(FSMA)130 which will be substantially similar to the MiFID II regime, EU
127 FCA, Whistleblowing in UK branches of foreign banks: Response to Consultation
Paper 16/25 (May 3, 2017), available at https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/policy/
ps17-07.pdf.
128 The bank of England anticipates that, at the point of exit, the UK authorities will apply
the recognition regime currently in force in the EU”, see BoE, The Bank of England’s
approach to the authorisation and supervision of international banks, insurers and
central counterparties (December 20, 2017), consultation papers available at https://
www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/2017/december/approach-to-authorisation-and-
supervision-of-international-banks-insurers-central-counterparties. For the post-con-
sultation statement see PRA Policy Statement PS 3/18, International banks: the Pru-
dential Regulation Authority’s approach to branch authorisation and supervision,
(March 28, 2018), available at https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/-/media/boe/files/
prudential-regulation/policy-statement/2018/ps318.pdf.
129 See ECB, ECB and BoE convene joint technical working group on Brexit-related risks
(April 27, 2018), available at https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2018/html/ecb.
pr180427_5.en.html.
130 Available online at https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/8/contents.
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firms being treated as third-country firms. Until further changes in the FSMA
this would mean that the substantive regulatory regime as laid down in the
MiFID II would be applicable, except for the institutional framework. Trans-
actions with retail clients or professional counterparties will be allowed for
firms that have established a branch and have been authorised in the UK131, and
meet the other conditions of MiFID II, as governed by UK law. These condi-
tions relate i.a. to the requirement to have, as a branch, sufficient capital – or
own funds – and respect the FATF anti-money laundering rules and the
OECD Model tax convention. Several aspects of the MiFID II regime will
have to be adapted in the corresponding UK regulation, such as the arrange-
ments for cooperation with the EU supervisors and the exchange of informa-
tion132.
Third-country investment firms were authorized by the FCA under the Mi-
FID I regime applying the EU rules under a reciprocity regime, Article 15.
Their activity would be limited to the state of establishment. In some cases,
they could avail themselves of the exemptions provided in the directive limit-
ing their activity, Articles 2 and 3. The Bank of England extended its super-
vision to the larger investment firms meeting certain risk related conditions,
called “Eligible Investment Firms”. This refers especially to firms acting as a
principal in investments and would be required to have a minimum capital of
730.000 euro, which is also the EU threshold133. The firms viewed are those
with a 15 billion GBP balance sheet or are part of a PRA regulated group.
Under MiFID II, this regime will generally have to conform to the require-
ments of that directive with respect to third country branches, but the con-
sequences would not be materially different134. Mention can be made of the
“reversed solicitation”135 exception, considered especially relevant for UK
firms intending to be active in the EU.
131 This is different from Article 39 (2) FSMA, where home country authorisation would
be required.
132 HM Treasury, Transposition of the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive II
(March 26, 2015), available at https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/up-
loads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/418281/PU_1750_MiFID_II_26.03.15.
pdf, pp. 9 et seq.
133 PRA Statement of Policy, Designation of investment firms for prudential supervision
by the Prudential Regulation Authority (March 25, 2013), on the basis of Article 8
FSMA.
134 Compare Article 39 MiFID II.
135 Article 42 MiFID II: “Provisions of services at the exclusive initiative to the client”.
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3. Statements about future supervisory practice
As is the case for the EU Supervisory Authorities, the UK authorities have also
published the policies and approaches they intend to follow after Brexit.
During the implementation period, they consider that the EU regulation
would remain applicable and indicate the need for appropriate cooperation
between the EU authorities.
The PRA has published a consultation paper outlining its future approach to
international banks operating in the UK, especially after the Brexit. It also
contains the basic elements applicable to all foreign banks. Firms under the
passport would have to adapt to the classification of the banks in different
categories of activity and risk. EU branches formally active as “passported”
branches will need to be authorised in the UK.
In the case of designated investment firms, establishment could take the form
of a subsidiary or of a branch. Their dual authorised form should apply for
authorisation from the BoE. The procedures are quite lengthy, 6 to 12 months
according to the FCA. Fit and proper rules will apply to the entire firm.
With respect to the larger non-UK banks, the subsidiary format may also be
required. The decisive criterion would be whether their home supervisory
standards are considered equivalent and meeting supervisory expectations as
formulated by the PRA136, while sufficient supervisory cooperation is in place,
or meeting the PRA’s criteria of supervisibility.
The third category are the systemically important or “wholesale” banks:
these may be allowed to continue to operate as a branch and subject to home
state supervision137, provided the PRA is satisfied on a number of super-
visory criteria: higher degree of supervisory cooperation, greater assurance
on resolution arrangements with stronger involvement of the PRA in terms
of influence and visibility, extending to the entire banking group. Size,
complexity and interconnectedness are mentioned as criteria: 15 bn GBP
gross assets in the UK, type of activity138. If these supervisory conditions
have not been met or would be ineffective as compared to the UK ones, the
PRA would require to apply specific regulatory requirements to the branch,
or require the bank to adopt the subsidiary format, to be supervised on a
136 PRA, Consultation Paper CP29/17, pp. 27 et seq. (at 5.10) and Supervisory Statement
1/18 (March 28, 2018).
137 PRA, Consultation Paper CP29/17, p. 11 (at 2.11).
138 Defined in the basis of the Critical Functions as defined in Supervisory Statement 10/
14 as “Critical Economic Functions”, see PRA, Consultation Paper CP29/17, p. 10 (at
2.10).
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standalone basis, with the application of a Multiple Point of Entry regime
for resolution.
On the basis of the present experience, the PRA would expect non-EEA
international banks active as wholesale branches not to be affected and to be
able to further operate as a branch. This would apply to the large US, Swiss
and Japanese banks. Other hypotheses will be kept on the PRA’s watch. For
EEA branches, additional scrutiny is planned if they may impact financial
stability in the UK139. Overseas mutual societies with branches in the UK
would not be materially affected. A similar approach has been proposed by
the Bank of England with respect to insurers, CCPs140 and CSDs.
In its most recent statement141 the PRA has essentially confirmed its previous
policies with respect to the authorisation and supervision of branches of
international banks142, which would be applicable to banks from the EU. This
policy would apply to all non-UK headquartered groups, both already present
or establishing themselves in the future. The basic rule is that these banks could
establish themselves as branches, unless incorporation would apply in order to
protect local depositors. Systemic wholesale branches are allowed under the
condition that the PRA has sufficient assurance over the supervisibility of the
branch. Consistency with the UK regulatory framework would be based on an
equivalence assessment. It is not expected that the non-EEA international
banks operating in the UK would be affected. If that is not the case, it would
require the bank to incorporate as a subsidiary. Retail143, and hence significant
deposit taking businesses, will not qualify for the branch regime and would
have to incorporate in the UK as a separate subsidiary, as these might endanger
the UK depositors and constitute a danger to the UK financial system and its
deposit protection scheme (risks exceeding 500m GBP144)145. Banks which do
not exceed these criteria can continue to function as branches, depending on
elements such as their systemic nature, their interconnectedness with the UK
139 PRA, Consultation Paper CP29/17, pp. 29–30 (Box 6).
140 BoE, The Bank of England’s approach to the authorisation and supervision of interna-
tional banks, insurers and central counterparties (December 20, 2017).
141 PRA, Policy Statement PS 3/18, p.
142 See PRA, Policy Statement PS 3/18.
143 5000 retail and SME customers.
144 Under the Financial Services Compensation Scheme.
145 See the letter from S. Woods, Contingency planning for the UK’s withdrawal from the
European Union (April 7, 2017); this policy was inaugurated by the BOE in 2015,
taking also into account the resolution system in its home jurisdictions: M. Arnold,
ING chief warns over UK access for European banks after Brexit, Financial Times
(August 2, 2017).
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financial system and the degree of supervisory cooperation and regulatory
equivalence. They could act worldwide.
The FCA regulates the conduct for a very wide range of financial services firms,
including banks and investment firms. It also acts as the prudential regulator
for a significant segment of these firms146 and shares its authority with the PRA
for banks. Its strategic objectives include the protection of the consumers of
financial services, protect financial markets and promote competition in and
among markets. In the Brexit context, the continuity of the services and the
avoidance of disruption are central concerns147. To that effect, the FCA men-
tioned that during the implementation period, in its view the EU passport
should remain applicable to UK firms148. The FCA could issue temporary
permissions to firms exclusively active in the UK and this to ensure continuity
while not excluding new activity to be developed149. In its external communica-
tion, the FCA drew attention to some specific issues that may disrupt this
continuity150: one concerns the continuity of the contracts, now generally based
on a reference to UK law151. The application of other legal systems, e.g. in the
insurance field, might be very disruptive, while the concern was expressed that
146 56000 firms are subject to the FCAs general oversight and 18000 firms to its prudential
supervision.
147 FCA, Statement on UK withdrawal (December 20, 2017), available at https://www.
fca.org.uk/news/statements/fca-statement-eu-withdrawal.
148 See FCA, Statement on UK withdrawal (December 20, 2017). As a consequence, EU
law would remain applicable. See for an update: FCA, Preparing your firm for Brexit,
(October 18, 2018), available at https://www.fca.org.uk/firms/preparing-for-brexit;
N. Delfas, Maintaining market confidence: an update on Brexit (November 5, 2018),
available at https://www.fca.org.uk/news/speeches/maintaining-market-confidence-
update-brexit.
149 FCA, Consultation Paper CP18/29, Temporary permissions regime for inbound firms
and funds (October 10, 2018). Available at https://www.fca.org.uk/publications/con-
sultation-papers/cp18-29-temporary-permissions-regime-inbound-firms-and-funds.
The EU technical standards will also be maintained.
150 See the statement made by A. Bailey on contract continuity, FCA’s Bailey Says Solve
Contract Continuity in Brexit, Bloomberg Markets (December 1, 2017), available at htt
ps://www.bloomberg.com/news/videos/2017-12-01/fca-s-bailey-solve-contract-conti
nuity-in-brexit-video.
151 Letter from S. Woods, Firms’ preparations for the UK’s withdrawal from the European
Union: planning assumptions (December 20, 2017), available at https://www.bank-
ofengland.co.uk/-/media/boe/files/prudential-regulation/letter/2017/firms-prepara-
tions-for-uk-withdrawal-from-the-eu.The treasury announced that it will legislate for
UK and non-UK contracts. Especially insurance contracts call attention. See on this
topic in the field of derivatives ISDA, Response of ISDA to the European Commission
Consultation Document on conflict of laws rules for third party effects of transactions in
securities and claims (June 29, 2017). The future ISDA agreement will refer to UK, Irish
and US law.
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this might even endanger the investors protection schemes152. Another point
addressed to the position of the asset managers after Brexit, and especially the
delegation practice, largely a reaction to the ESMA Opinion on the same
subject where the “letter-box” entities have been severely criticised. The FCA
declared that appropriate oversight is exercised on this practice, but that it is
conscious that sensible outcomes have to be found on this subject153. Close
cooperation is neededwith the EEA regulators and the ESAs.
The powers of the FCAwill also be extended including supervision of Credit
ratings agencies and trade repositories, as these are now supervised by
ESMA154.
D. Conclusion
After the United Kingdom will have left the European Union, the question
will arise what the rules are for further activities in each other’s financial
markets. Brexit will not be the end of financial services being provided in each
other jurisdictions. Even in case of a hard Brexit, activities will be carried on
through separate legal entities or even branches. But the rules will change and
the United Kingdom will have the status of a third country, losing its rights
based on the “passport”. Many of the issues mentioned in this paper could
however be solved by a transition agreement, even in absence of a full passport
as applicable pre-Brexit. At the moment of writing, there is no definite infor-
mation available which way such an agreement – if any –might go. A transition
period may extent until 2020, during which existing rules would remain in
force, but afterwards, we do not know.
The comparative analysis of the policy positions on the background of the
applicable regulations reveals some interesting differences.
For both parties, there is a clear intention to defend or promote the attractive-
ness of their own market. The way this objective is achieved is however
considerably different.
For the EU, the master card is the passported access to the EU, the large
European economic zone, allowing to offer services without additional
authorisations in all EU member States. Only firms legally established in EU
152 C. Binham, FCA raises concerns over pots-Brexit access to consumer protections, Finan-
cial Times (October 10, 2017).
153 C. Binham, FCA warns against post-Brexit shake-up of investment rules, Financial
Times (September 28, 2017).
154 See FCA, Statement on UKwithdrawal (December 20, 2017).
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Member States are entitled to the benefits of the passport. Whether third
country firms could also qualify for the passport, depends on their form of
establishment; with respect to certain activities, access to EU markets can be
obtained, provided that the firm has fully conformed to EU rules, that com-
pliance is ensured and can be verified by EU bodies – such as the ESAs or their
members – and that where needed these rules can be applied by the courts,
ultimately under the guidance of the European Court of Justice. The outcome
of this approach is that the business will have to be run out of a local legal
entity, a subsidiary, triggering quite substantial regulatory requirements. If the
branch form is chosen, access will be limited to the state of location and subject
to that state’s authorisation after having met some high-level conditions, how-
ever, without local EU supervision. Over time third country investment firms
may obtain an EU-wide passport, but only after the EU Commission has
declared their legal and regulatory regime equivalent. Access to the EU will
become more difficult, more expensive, but not impossible.
The UK repeatedly points to the importance of London as the international
financial centre, especially for services that are not on offer in most other EU
jurisdictions, or at least not on the same terms (e.g. CCPs, wholesale banking,
asset management). Therefore, the expectation is that financial institutions will
keep their actual presence in London or may even open a new one, and this to
service the EU, but also the world financial markets. To support this tendency,
the UK regulations continues to offer wide access by way of branches, not
only for the large international wholesale banks, but also for smaller institu-
tions provided the supervisory regime is equivalent or at least acceptable to the
UK authorities. When UK investors could be endangered, a stricter regime
will apply, including mandatory incorporation as a separate subsidiary.
The way the attractiveness of each of these two markets is being presented
points to a difference in approach: welcoming to foreign entrants in the UK,
caution and defensiveness in the EU.
The EU side has reached out to firms located in the UK to relocate to the
EU. The relocation as such is a quite complex exercise and would normally
imply creation or reactivation of subsidiaries. Relocation will be quite expen-
sive for new entrants.
Is this a remnant of “Fortress Europe”? For many years, the EU has protected
its markets against foreign operators, rarely excluding full access, but often
making access available only under strict conditions, spelled out in countless
regulations These restrictions are not always attributable to measures of eco-
nomic policy being based on objectives as investor protection, market effi-
ciency, a level playing field or financial stability. In many cases, they may also
result in protecting the EU financial industry, not necessarily making it more
resilient.
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The UK approach is different: in its quite accommodating view on the financial
services industry, it has been able to attract all mayor players in the world,
offering the most sophisticated services in terms of market organisation,
transactional expertise and financing power, but also in dispute settlement.
Between the two systems, bridges will have to be built. These come in different
shapes: as there is no clarity on the shape the Brexit transition regime, one can
hope that the market forces will drive the regulatory systems towards identical,
or at least parallel solutions. The internal financial services market could be
maintained, provided the supervisors agree on common approaches. A lesser
solution would be the recognition of equivalence, a less stable, partial solution,
but flexible and adaptable to newmarket needs155. Unilateral measures abound,
UK firms get full access to the EU if they establish a subsidiary there. If they
are less ambitious, a branch may do as well. Access rights can be granted by
equivalence decisions.
What will be the effect of these changes on the relocation of financial institu-
tions or of financial activity in one jurisdiction or the other is difficult to
measure. A certain number of large banking groups have indicated that they
relocate part of their activities to existing or new subsidiaries in Frankfurt,
Dublin, Paris or Amsterdam, affecting some – initially limited – part of their
staff to the new location. The same applies to the relocation of parts of trading
platforms. The proximity to EBA may also play some role. In the other
direction, about 1200 UK entities are branches of EU firms and many of these
will have to be authorised by the PRA. It is not possible to predict what the
effect on financial activity and employment will be. Moreover, much will
depend on the long-term effect on the development of the business in both
markets.
155 E. Wymeersch, Third-Country Equivalence and Access to the EU Financial Markets
Including in Case of Brexit, J. Fin. Reg. 2018, 209.
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